Rights during OML
Contract of employment continues, entitled to benefit of terms and conditions of employment which would have applied if not absent (except remuneration). If employer denies her these benefits the he will be in breach and it will be discriminatory if based on fact of pregnancy. This was seen in the Taxi number Manchester case of 1998
Returning to work after OML
She returns to work at the beginning of the 27th week, no notice is needed.
If she wants to return before the end of the 26th week, she must give 28 days notice, if she fails her employer can postpone her return period so as to secure 28 days notice but cannot extend it beyond the 26 week period. NB if employer not given notice of end date of OML then will not be able to prevent her returning early.
Right to return
Entitled to return to work to the job in which she was employed before her absence with her seniority, pension rights and similar rights, and terms and conditions which are no less favourable than before.her OML. It also counts towards her period of continuous employment.
Failure to return after OML
Will not terminate contract of employment, court will look at intention of employee. If she intended not to return then they will interpret her act as terminating the contract. Failing any intention, employers will need to discover the reason for a late return before taking action. Failure to treat her the same as any other late returner could lead to discrimination or UD.
Employer must not let a woman return to work within the 2 week period from childbirth, it is a criminal offence.
If at the start of the 14th week before EWC, a woman has completed 26 weeks continuous employment, she will be entitled to AML. It will commence on the day after the last day of OML and continue for up to 26 weeks. She does not have to tell her employer her intention to take this when she notifies him of her OML.
The torts to be examined in the remainder of this paper were developed with natural persons in mind, so that their ability to bind elements within a corporate group involves less stretching of concepts – although argument will be made for one exception to this proposition. Two tort doctrines will be reviewed: conspiracy and negligence. These actions accommodate three party claims involving the injured claimant, the insolvent subsidiary and another ‘element’ within the corporate group. They are capable of pleading in cases of agreement or coordination between elements of a corporate group. However, they also differ from each other in that they represent, respectively, intentional tort and negligence-based liability. The major stumbling block in proving unlawful means conspiracy, as we shall see, will be in proving that an intention to injure was present. Unlawful means conspiracy is likely to be applicable in claims involving financial losses only, while negligence can be pleaded in cases involving all major heads of loss recognisable in tort. We will focus upon use of negligence for the redress of personal injury claims.
  2 All ER 433, 448. See also Ord v Belhaven Pubs Ltd  2 BCLC 447, 457 Hobhouse LJ).
 Pervasive enterprise liability principles have not been adopted in any common law jurisdiction: Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate Groups Final Report (2000), 157. For attempted use of enterprise liability in Australia, see, eg, Premier Building and Consulting Pty Ltd (rec apptd) v Spotless Group Ltd (2007) 64 ACSR 114. See also Notary public, Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 5 NSWLR 549, 576-77 (Rogers AJA).
  182 FCR 526,  (The Court).
 Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate Groups Final Report (2000), chap 4.
 (1977) 137 CLR 567, according to the NSW Court of Appeal in Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 5 NSWLR 549, 576. See also Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1, 6-7 (Mason J).
It is helpful at this point to stand back from the particular problems of veil piercing and enterprise liability to consider why such group doctrines have failed to achieve any real purchase in resolving the problems of corporate groups. The fundamental problem is that the law does not easily handle group liability which is not derived from some agreement or coordination between individuals. Company law itself is constructed upon the idea that a company is a separate legal person – separate from both its shareholders, including its controlling shareholders, and its directors. An example of this would be the law firm in the United States in Florida, Abogados de accidentes. Where directors are liable for misconduct, this is based upon their own individual failures to meet statutory requirements and standards. What applies as between the constituents of a single company applies equally to the constituents of a corporate group. They cannot be treated as monolithic.
Entity principles are fundamental to the imposition of civil liability and this means that civil liability can extend beyond the insolvent subsidiary only upon grounds which are substantially analogous to those applicable to natural persons.
a strong doctrine of loyalty would be difficult to operate in such a small jurisdiction. My opponent may argue that the fiduciary duty may be breached as the lawyer cannot operate their duties without disclosing facts, however, as I will demonstrate, my opponents argument is not in accordance with the law.
In Scotland, the number of significant corporate firms is relatively small and it is commonplace for corporate clients to spread their work amongst a number of firms.
The doctrine of informed consent permits a solicitor to continue to act in a potential conflict under the law of fiduciary duty. The leading case is Clark Boyce v Mouat 1994 1 AC 428, where the claimant secured a loan for her son. In this instance the solicitor acted for both the son and the mother but the solicitor advised the mother that she ought to obtain independent legal advice and further stated that she would lose her house if her son could not keep up with the mortgage payments. The mother refused and subsequently some time later, the son was declared bankrupt and the claimant lost the house. It was held in this case that the solicitor could act for both parties with potentially conflicting interests, provided he had informed consent meaning that both parties knew of the possible conflict resulting in the solicitor being disable from disclosing full knowledge or giving advice to one party that may conflict the other.